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QUANTITATIVE UNDERSTANDING OF
EXPLOSIVE STI_IULUS TRANSFER
BY
M. L. Schimmel
McDonnell Aircraft Company
McDonnell Douglas Corporation
SUM,_IARY
The primary objective of this test program was to answer the fundamental
question: "How is detonation transfer accomplished?" This information is
needed to optimize initiation designs for such critical applications as staging,
structural severance, escape systems, and explosive trains.
Five different explosives and two basic donor and acceptor configurations
were evaluated. Three of the explosives and the donor/acceptor designs were
selected because of their extensive aerospace usage. The remaining two accep-
tor explosives were included to extend the range of sensitivities tested. The
donor design variables studied were size, confinement, closure material, ex-
plosive quantity and explosive compaction pressure. Changing these parameters
controlled the amount of energy in the donor closure fragments and in the
gaseous detonation products. The effect on detonation transfer was studied by
adjusting the separation air gap between donor and acceptor, and also by vary-
ing five acceptor parameters. These were: explosive sensitivity, particle
size, closure thickness, closure density, and confinement. For each config-
uration tested, an approximate 50%-fire point was determined. From these data
the following detonation transfer principles are indicated:
(I) The amount of energy supplied by a donor, compared to that required
by an acceptor for initiation, determines whether detonation transfer
takes place.
(2) Donorenergy sources are high-velocity closure fragments, gaseous
detonation products, or a combination of the two. Experimental
methodsdeveloped for measuring donor energy are described.
(3) Energy reaching the acceptor explosive is reduced with increases in
air gap, acceptor closure thickness, or density. Theseparameters
attenuate gaseousenergy more severely than fragment energy.
(4) Initiation energy requirements of acceptor explosives are indicated
by gap test sensitivity results.
INTRODUCTION
This program, "Quantitative Understanding of Explosive Stimulus Transfer
(QUEST)," sought to provide data which are basic to the use of high explosives
in snacecraft and military aircraft, or as part of an explosive train. Examples
of these applications are given in Figure I, and include staging, stimulus
transfer, structural severance, and jettison. Initiation of all of these func-
tions is normally accomplished by means of a detonator separated by an air gap
from an explosive acceptor. For most flight aDplications, successful initia-
tion is compromised by the requirements to:
(I) minimize the quantity of explosives used
(2) ensure handling safety by employing relatively insensitive explosives
(3) provide environmentally protected assemblies
(4) propagate over gaps and at angles dictated by installation and pro-
duction restraints
FIGURE 1 APPLICATIONS OF DETONATION TRANSFER
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Despite the critical uses of aerospace explosive systems, and the untold
millions of explosive trains that have been built, tests of detonation trans-
fer have been confined primarily to empirical measurements for determining
whether a proposed design is sufficiently reliable for the intended use. While
these measurements do not provide the kind of information needed to optimize
designs, they have generally resulted in flightworthy hardware. Thus, the
limitations of currently used methods are described merely to illustrate the
problem for which this program sought to provide better understanding.
The most common met}iod of demonstrating reliability of detonation trans-
fer involves testing at gaps greater than permitted by actual installation,
with analysis by the Bruceton technique (ref. I). Another approach to the
problem is the VARICOMP technique developed at the Naval Ordnance Laboratory,
White Oak, Maryland (ref. 2). In this method, production geometry is main-
tained during testing, but explosive output or sensitivity is varied. A sta-
tistical analysis is then performed to determine probability of proDagation.
Both tests are conducted in such a manner that propagation failures are
expected. These failures are treated statistically as caused by being fired
over too large a gap, or at too insensitive an acceptor. As a result, a
marginal donor, which should be cause for lot rejection or design modification,
may be missed. This is a serious deficiency from the standpoint of aerospace
applications where relatively few tests are conducted because of high unit
cost, and yet extremely high reliability is required. A more basic shortcoming
of these methods is that they do not disclose the precise reason for failing to
initiate detonation. Thus, they do not clearly point the way to better designs.
The only military standards dealing with detonator output involve dent
tests (ref. 3). While the stated purpose is "---to measure output and check
uniformity of performance---," they do so only with respect to gaseous deton-
ation products. These tests do not measure the effect of the detonator closure.
With respect to accomplishing detonation transfer, the energy available from
closure fragments was shown to be significantly greater than that from gaseous
detonation products for all donor configurat_6ns tested in the QUEST program.
The specific design variables studied during this program are illustrated
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FIGURE2 VARIABLES STUDIED
in Figure 2. The initial approach was to measure velocity of donor closure
fragments, compute the pressure that would be induced in an acceptor explo-
sive, and compare this value to the pressure known to be required for accep-
tor initiation from Small Scale Gap Test (SSGT) results (ref. 4). This test
measures the sensitivity of an acceptor in terms of the thickness of poly-
methyl methacrylate that can be interDosed between it and a standardized, pre-
cisely controlled donor, and still accomplish detonation transfer. The great-
er the thickness of plastic, the lower the pressure that reaches the acceptor.
Originally, acceptor sensitivity was reported in arbitrary units based on
this thickness. More recently, this test has been calibrated so that results
can he,expressed in units of pressure (ref. 5), and such sensitivity values
have been reported for most explosives of aerospace interest, (ref. 6).
Although it was recognized that the time of pressure application by the
SSGT would be exceedingly long in comparison to the application time for
pressure generated by thin donor fragments, the significance of this difference
was unknown. When the initial QUEST tests were run, it was learned that this
difference was crucial. That is, even when the pressure calculated to have
been induced in an acceptor explosive by donor closure fragments was sub-
stantially greater than that shown to be required by SSGT results, propaga-
tion did not take place. The reason for this apparent contradiction has
been established by Walker and Wasley (ref. 7). They showed that the energy
induced in an acceptor explosive is the critical parameter for initiation,
not the pressure. Thus, for the initial tests with thin donor closure frag-
ments, and the resulting short time of application, the amount of energy in-
duced in the acceptor explosive was less than from the SSGT, even though the
pressure was greater.
While the critical energy concept was developed based on experiments
with very large driver plates and acc_ptor charges, test results show that this
concept can also be applied to small explosive devices used for aerospace ap-
plications. Further, it appears that there is a relationship between critical
energy of initiation and SSGT sensitivities for a wide range of explosives.
Therefore, an estimate of the required initiation energy is available for most
acceptor explosives. Thus, the QUEST program suggests a new approach to the
problem of determining reliability of detonation transfer by measuring only
donor parameters. These measurements of both donor fragment and gaseous pro-
duct energy should also show how detonator designs can be optimized from the
standpoint of output.
APPARATUS
All experiments were performed at the McDonnellAircraft Comnany,Solid
Propellant and Explosive Devices Test Laboratory. The apparatus consisted of
donors and acceptors designed for investigation of snecific narameters, ex-
plosives with a wide range of sensitivities, and test fixtures for determining
propagation and donor fragment characteristics.
Donor Configurations
The two basic donor designs selected for this study are illustrated in
Figure 3. The flight configuration type was chosen because of its widespread
usage in aerospace programs, including Anollo, F-Ill crew module, F-14, F-15,
and B-I escape systems. A simplified experimental configuration was used
to obtain a lower-cost test Dart. The detonating cord consisted of 5.3 mg/cm
(2.5 grains per foot) of hexanitrostilbene (HNS-II) in aluminum sheathing. Fer-
rule and output charges were HNS-I. The closure cup was 0.38 cm (0.15 inch) in
diameter, and 0.010 cm (0.004 inch) thick stainless steel. An electric blasting
cap was used to initiate the detonating cord. Upon detonation, the closure cup
breaks into a predictable pattern of high velocity fragments. Details concern-
in_ development of this desiqn are given in References 8 and 9.
The experimental configuration donor, also shown in Figure 3, was used to
hermit design parameters to be varied more easily than with the cup configura-
tion. Because the output charge was loaded into a brass bushing, it provided
more confinement than the cup configuration. The bushing was 1.91 cm
(0.75 inch) long, with an outside diameter of 1.27 cm (0.50 inch) and an inside
diameter of 0.38 cm (0.15 inch). Since no ferrule_charge was used, the det-
onating cord size was increased to 42.4 mg/cm (20 grains per foot) of RDX in
lead sheathing.
In order to obtain donors with different output levels, the cup configura-
tion donor size was maintained, but the quantity and loading pressure of the
explosive in the ferrule and closure cup were reduced, resulting in lowered
fragment velocity. Loading pressure units are given in newtons per square cen-
timeter (N/cm2) as well as pounds per square inch. A summary of the
T
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FIGURE3 DONOR DESIGNS
performance of donor cun configurations is given in Table I. The velocity of
the cup bottom fragments was measured experimentally. Energy her unit area
was calculated as:
where
KE MV2
A 2A
KE
_= fragment kinetic energy per unit area
M = mass of fragments
V = measured fragment velocity
A = area of cup bottom
Acceptor Configurations
Acceptor designs, shown in Figure 4, are essentially mirror-images of the
donors. Again, the cup design provided light confinement; the bushing con-
figuration, heavy confinement and easier variation of design parameters. Both
acceptor types used 42.4 mg/cm (20 grains per foot) of lead sheathed RDX Cet-
onating cord butted against the compacted acceptor explosive to provide a
positive indication of acceptor detonation. The cup configuration contained
65 mg of explosive in a stainless steel cup which was 0.38 cm (0.15 inch) in
diameter, and O.OlO cm (O.O04) inch thick. For the acceptor with heavy
confinement, the closure was bonded to the bushing prior to explosive loading.
Except for the one series of tests in which size was varied, the acceptor con-
tained 65 mg of explosive with a column diameter of 0.28 cm (0.15 inch).
Acceptor explosives.- Because acceptor explosive sensitivity was con-
sidered to be of major importance in determining detonation transfer proba-
bility, materials for which this information was available were procured from
Naval Ordnance Laboratory, White Oak, Haryland. The listing of explosives in
Table 2 illustrates the wide range of SSGT sensitivities investigated in this
program. Photomicrographs of these explosives are shown in Figure 5.
Donor
Group
-1
-2
-3
-4
-5
-6
TABLE1 DONOR PERFORMANCE
(Cup Configurations)
Loading
Pressure,
N/cm 2 (psi)
Weight of HNS-I
(+2 mg)
Ferrule Output
Cup Bottom Fragments
Average
Velocity,
cm/psee (ft/sec)
Average
Energy/Area
(cal/cm 2)
22,000 37
(32,000)
11,000 32
(16,000)
5,600 28
(8,000)
2,800 25
(4,000)
1,400 22
(2,000)
700 19
(1,000)
6_
57
50
44
39
37
0.276
(9040)
0.263
(8620)
0.244
(8ooo)
0.203
(6640)
0.189
(6200)
0.175
(5750)
72
66
56
39
34
29
Light Confinement
Detonating Cord
Cup
FIGURE 4
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TABLE 2 ACCEPTOR EXPLOSIVE SENSITIVITIES
Explosive
RDX (Cyclotr imethylenetr initramine)
HNS-II (2,2', 4,4', 6,6'- Hexanitrostilbene)
HNS-I (2,2', 4,4', 6,6' - Hexanitrostilbene)
DATB (1,4-Diamino-2,4,6-Trinitrobenzene)
TATB (1,3,5-Triamino.2,4,6.Trinitrobenzene)
Naval Ordnance
Lab Lot
Number
189
528
537
315
398
SSGT Sensitivity
(kbar) at 11,000 N/cm 2
Loading Pressure
11
15
21
39
74
lO
"N
C
m
m
0
_xJ
m
X
0
<
m
--r
O
O
O
"V
"i"
X
0
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Test Fixtures
Proper alignment of donor and acceptor for propagation tests was accomp-
lished with a Vee-block fixture, Figure 6. For simultaneous measurement of
donor end and side fragment velocity, the test fixture illustrated in Figure 7
was used. The witness blocks were Lucite, and they provided an indication of
fragment pattern, as well as a passive check (by the extent of crazing) on
velocity measurements. Because it was found that foil switches would affect
propagation results, it was necessary to develop the "partial-foil" switch
shown in Figure 8. This switch is triggered by fragments at the outer edge of
the pattern, and permits all of the center fragments to Dass through unaffected.
Figure 9 is a circuit diagram of the electronic instrumentation used in con-
junction with the switches and the fragment velocity test fixture.
Witness
Acceptur
Blasting
Blast Deflector
Vee Blocks
FIGURE6 PROPAGATION TEST FIXTURE
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FIGURE7 TEST FIXTURE FOR FRAGMENT VELOCITY MEASUREMENT
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FIGURE9 FRAGMENT VELOCITY MEASUREMENT CIRCUIT DIAGRAM
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TESTPROCEDURE
Estimation of 50%-Fire Point
Becausethe objective of this programwas to investigate a wide range
of variables involved in detonation transfer rather than any specific design,
a procedure was used which permitted determination of approximate 50%-fire
configurations with relatively few tests, usually only four or five. For
example, if the variable being investigated was air gad between donor and
acceptor, a separation distance was selected for the first test. If success-
ful propagation resulted, the gap was doubled for the next test; a propaga-
tion failure resulted in running the second test at one-half the separation
gap. Successive tests were then conducted at gans midway between the last suc-
cess and failure. The a_proximate 50%-fire point reported is the mid-point
between the smallest propagation fail gap and the largest successful propaga-
tion gap.
Donor Output Determination
Measurements were made of the effects of donor fragments alone, gaseous
detonation products alone, or the combined effects of the two. This was accom-
plished by selection of air gap distance between donor and acceptor. For gaps of
1.27 cm (0.50 inch), or more, it was assumed that energy from gaseous products
was negligible (tests later proved this assumption valid), and the acceptor
was affected only by donor fragments. For those tests in which donor fragment
velocity and propagation were measured simultaneously, it was necessary to use
separation air gaps of as much as 7.62 cm (3.0 inches). This large a gap was
needed to ensure that the stop switch was triggered by fragments rather than
by detonation gases. Lucite impact patterns showed that donor fragments were
not significantly dispersed in spite of this large gap. In order to measure
the effect of gaseous energy alone, the bottom of the donor closure cup was
cut off, or no closure was used on the bushing, thus eliminating end fragments.
For measurements of the combined effects of donor fragments and gases, tests
were conducted at a 0.38 cm (0.15 inch) air gap.
z5
Experimental Conditions
Throughout the program, all experiments were performed at ambient tempera-
ture and pressure, All propagation testing was in oDen air; that is, while
the fixture provided alignment, there was no confinement in the peripheral area
between the donor and acceptor,
16
TEST RESULTS
This section presents results of experiments with donor/acceptor vari-
ables, and discusses both their theoretical and practical significance. A
program summary is given by task, to show how the program developed, and to
provide a convenient tabulation of results for each variable tested. Then,
significant aspects from each phase, grouped as donor or acceptor variables,
are mentioned. Finally, the results are discussed functionally based on the
effect of donor high-velocity fragments, gaseous detonation products, and the
combined action of both.
Throughout the tabulation and discussion, certain terms are used inter-
changeably; i.e., "propagation," "initiation," and "fire" all refer to det-
onation of the acceptor explosive as evidenced by initiation of the RDX det-
onating cord, and the resulting metal erosion. Also, the term, "shock initia-
tion," is applied to those tests in which only the effect of donor gaseous det-
onation products was being evaluted.
Summary of Results
The information presented in Table 3 summarizes the results obtained in
tasks 1 through 6 of Contract NAS 1-9903, and tasks 7 through 12 of Contract
NAS 1-10762 in chronological order.
Donor variables.-
Fragment velocity (task I): this series of tests used donors from the six
groups listed in Table I. Each of these donors was the same physical size, and
all detonated. However, because the quantity and compaction pressure of the
explosive was varied, donor output decreased in discrete increments between the
upper (-I donor) and lower (-6 donor) limits. Failure of fragments from a -I
donor to initiate TATB was contrary to expectations, based on a pressure com-
parison of SSGT sensitivity and that computed as induced by donor fragments.
However, reducing the air gap between the donor and acceptor to 0.38 cm (0.15
inch), where gaseous energy was superimposed on fragment energy, resulted in
ZY
TABLE3 TEST PROGRAM RESULTS SUMMARY
Task No.
Variable Test Setup
I. Donor Fragment
Velocity
2. Accepter
Confinement
3. Accepter Closure
Thickness
4. Accepter
Explosive
5. Accepter
Explosive
Particle Size
Donor Accepter
Donor Accepter
Air Gap = 0.38 cm
Accepter Explosive: TATB at
11,000 N/cm 2
-2 Donor Accepter
Air Gap = 0.38 cm
Accepter Closure: Steel
Accepter Explosive: TATB
-2 Donor Accepter
Steel
Air Gap = 0.38 cm
Accepter Closure:
-2 Donor Accepter
Accepter Closure = 0.010 cm Steel
Results
I. Fragment energy alone, even from -1 Donor would
not initiate TATB at 11,000 N/cm 2
2. At a 0.38 em air gap, -I and -2 Donors produced
AIt Fires; -3 fired 1 of 5; -4, -5, -0 gave No Fires
3. Fragment energy alone from -2) -3, -4 Donors
initiated DATB at 22,000 N/cm ; -5 Donors gave
No Fires
1. -1, -2 Donors produced All Fires,
-3, -4 Donors gave No Fires
TATB Compaction
Pressure {N/cm 2)
Approximate 50% Fire Accepter
Closure Thickness (cm)
11,000 ...................... 0.015
5,500 ...................... 0.020
2,800 ...................... 0.020
-2 Donor Accepter
Air Gap = 1.27 cm
Accepter Closure: Steel
Accepter Explosives Approximate 50% Fire Accepter
22,000 N/cm 2 Compaction Closure Thickness (cm)
DATB. 0.033
HNS-I ....................... 0.064
RDX ....................... 0.064
Shock Initiation (Donor Cup Buttom Removed)
Accepter Explosive Approximate 50% Fire
22,000 N/cm 2 Compaction Air Gap (cm)
HNS-I ........................ 0.20
HNS-]]" ....................... 0.22
Fragment Initiation
Accepter Explosive ! Approximate 50% Fire Accepter
22,000 N/cm 2 Compaction Closure Thickness (cm)
HNS-I ....................... 0.064
HNS-Tr ...................... 0.028
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
TEST PROGRAM RESULTS SUMMARY
Task No.
Variable
6. Acceptor
Closure
Materials
7. Separation
Air Gap
8. Acceptor
Closure
Thickness
Test Setup
-2 Donor Acceptor
Acceptor Explosive: HNS-I at
22,000 N/cm 2
-2 Donor Acceptor
Air Gap = 1.27 cm
Acceptor Explosive: HNS-II at
22,000 N/cm 2
-2 Donor Acceptor
Acceptor Explosive: TATB at
11,000 N/cm 2
-2 Donor
No Closure on Donor
or Acceptor
Acceptor
-2 Donor Acceptor
Acceptor Explosive: HNS-I at
22,000 N/cm 2
Acceptor Closure: Steel
Results
Shock Initiation (Donor Cup Bottom Removed)
Acceptor Closure Material Approximate 50% Fire
and Thickness (cm) Air Gap (cm)
No Closure ....................... 0.356
Aluminum, 0.028 .................. 0.240
Lead, 0.036 ....................... 0.048
Fragment Initiation
Acceptor Approximate 50% Fire
Closure Material Closure Thickness (cm)
Lead .................. 0.033
Steel .................. 0.028 (Task No. 5)
Combined Shock and Fragment Initiation
Acceptor Closure Material Approximate 50% Fire
and Thickness (cm) Air Gap (cm)
No Closure .............. 1.04
Aluminum, 0.028 ........ 0.35
Steel, 0.010 ............. 0.51 (Task No. 1,-1 Donor)
Acceptor Explosive, Compaction
Pressure (N/cm2), SSGT
Sensitivity (kbar)
Approximate 50% Fire
Air Gap (cm)
RDX at 22,000, 14 ............ 0.325
HNS-I at 5,500, 20 ............ 0.649
HNS-I at 22,000, 25 ........... 0.356 (Task No. 6)
DATB at 6,900, 36 ............ 0.183
TATB at 5,500, 53 ............ 0.086
TATB at 11,000, 74 ........... 0.198
Approximate 50% Fire
Acceptor Closure Thickness (cm)
Air Gap (cm)
0 ................................ 0.356 (Task No. 6)
0.013 0.236
0.020 ............................ 0.112
0.030 ............................ 0.056
0.051 ............................ 0.008
0.081 ............................ 0
0.013 (HNS-I at 5,500 N/cm 2) ....... 0.427
3_9
TABLE 3 (Continued)
TEST PROGRAM RESULTS SUMMARY
Task No.
Variable
9. Acceptor Closure
Materials
Test Setu p
10. Donor
Fragment
Energy
11. Donor Size
-2 Donor Acceptor
Acceptor Explosive: HNS-I at
22,000 N/cm 2
Acceptor Closure Thickness: 0.030 cm
12. Donor Closure
Material
Donor Acceptor
Air Gap = 7.8 cm
Donor, Acceptor
Closure: 0.010 cm Steel
Acceptor Explosive: TATB at
11,000 N/cm 2
Donor Acceptor
Donor Explosive: HNS-I at
11,000 N/cm 2
Acceptor Explosive: HNS-I at
22,000 N/cm 2
Column Length: 0.51 cm
Donor Acceptor
Air Gap = 1.27 cm
Donor Closure = 0.010 cm Steel
Acceptor Closure: Steel
Donor Acceptor
Air Gap = 1.27 cm
Donor Explosive: HNS-I at
11,000 N/cm 2
Acceptor Explosive: HNS-I at
22,000 N/cm 2
Acceptor Closure: Steel
Results
Acceptor Closure Material Approximate 50% Fire
Density (g/cm 3) Air Gap (cm)
Lead, 11.3 ....................... 0.001
Brass,8.5 ........................ 0.050
Steel, 7.9 ........................ 0.058
Aluminum, 2.6 ................... 0.173
PMMA, 1.2 ...................... 0.188
Average Donor Fragment
Velocity (cm//zsec), Energy Propagation Frequency
(cal/cm 2)
0.286, 78 ..................... 9 of 9
0.274, 71 ..................... 3 of 6
0.200, 38 ..................... 2 of 5
Shock Initiation
Explosive Column I Approximate 50% Fire
Diameter (cm) I Air Gap (cm)
0.381 ....................... 0.340
0.318 .............. 0.193
0.254 ....................... 0.140
0.191 ....................... 0.117
Fragment Initiation
Explosive Column Approximate 50% Fire Acceptor
Diameter (cm) Closure Thickness (cm}
0.381 ...................... 0.094
0.318 ...................... 0.094
0.254 ..................... 0.018
0.191 ...................... 0.066
Donor Closure Material,
Thickness (cm)
Approximate 50% Fire Acceptor
Closure Thickness (cm)
Steel, 0.010 ....................... 0.094
Titanium, 0.020 .................... 0.094
Brass, 0.010 ....................... 0.086
Aluminum, 0.030 ................... 0.046
2O
initiation of TATB with the more powerful donors. Substitution of a more sen-
sitive acceptor explosive, DATB, resulted in successful initiation using only
donor fragments.
Fragment energy (task I0): in order to provide more donor fragment energy
than that available in task I, an experimental configuration donor, which pro-
vided greater sidewall confinement, was used. Using a donor containing I00 mg
of HNS-I compacted at 22,000 N/cm2 (32,000 psi) resulted in an average fragment
energy of 78 cal/cm 2. This donor consistently initiated a TATB acceptor across
a 7.6 cm (3 inch) air gap. Reducing the quantity of donor explosive and the
compaction pressure, resulted in less fragment energy and reduced frequency of
propagation.
Size (task II): donors and acceptors with the four explosive column dia-
meters shown in Table 3 were tested for detonation transfer by shock and frag-
ment initiation. For shock initiation, the 50%-fire air gap decreased signi-
ficantly as explosive column diameter was reduced. In contrast, _or fragment
initiation, successful propagation occurred over large air gaps and through
thick acceptor closures, even when the explosive column diameter was signi-
ficantly reduced. The quantity of explosive used in the donors tested was 89,
60, 46, and 20 mg, respectively. Plate dent tests were conducted on the
0.381 cm (0.15 inch) donor, with and without an end closure, and essentially
identical results were obtained, in spite of the marked difference in propa-
gation ability. The design significance of this observation is discussed in
"APPLICATION OF RESULTS" section.
Closure material (task 12): for donor closures with approximately equal
weight per unit area, the materials tested have the following performance
ranking: titanium, steel, brass, and aluminum. This is based on measurements
of donor fragment velocity and pattern, as well as ability to transfer det-
onation.
Acceptor variables.-
Confinement (task 2): substitution of the bushing for the cup config-
uration acceptor resulted in substantially increased explosive confinement.
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However,propagation results were not affected, and the bushing configuration
acceptor was used in tasks 2 through 12 because it provided a moreconvenient
meansof varying design parameters.
Closure thickness (tasks 3, 8): in task 3, the donors used were all -2
type, containing 89 mgHNS-Icompactedat II,0_0 N/cm2 (16,000 psi). The TATB
acceptor explosive wascompactedat reduced pressures to increase its sensitiv-
ity. The approximate 50%-fire acceptor closure thickness increased with in-
creasing acceptor sensitivity. Task 8 differed from, and extended the investi-
gation of, task 3 in that the donor cup bottom was removed.This permitted the
measurementof donor shockenergy attenuation by varying the thickness of
steel acceptor closures. Test data showthat the 50%-fire air gap decreases
as acceptor closure thickness increases. The result with HNS-Iat 5,500
N/cm2(8000 psi) showsinitiation over a substantially larger gap than would
be expected from the remainder of the data of this task.
Closure materials (tasks 6, 9): in task 6 the effects of having no accep-
tor closure, as well as having closures of aluminum, steel, and lead were evalu-
ated with respect to initiation by shock, fragments, or a combination of the
two. Best propagation wasobtained with no acceptor closure. Attenuation of
detonation transfer was related to acceptor closure mass. Task 9 extended the
work of task 6 with respect to shock energy attenuation. Five different
acceptor closure materials were used. Thesehad a wide range of densities,
but a constant thickness. Results confirmed that attenuation was related to
acceptor closure mass.
Explosive material (task 4): this task wasessentially a continuation of
task 3. Still more sensitive acceptors were tested by selection of the indi-
cated explosives. Again, the more sensitive the explosive, the thicker the
acceptor closure through which propagation could be accomplished.
Explosive particle size (task 5): the effect of explosive particle s_ze
was investigated, using HNS-I (under 5 microns) and HNS-II (under 50 microns).
Table 3 results showHNS-II to be moresensitive to shock initiation, and
HNS-I to be more sensitive to fragment initiation. This apparent sensitivity
reversal is significant from the standpoint of hardwaredesign, and is dis-
cussed in "APPLICATIONOFRESULTS."
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Sensitivity (task 7): the decay in donor shock energy wasmeasured,
using acceptor explosives of various sensitivities. Generally, the more sen-
sitive acceptor explosives could be initiated over larger air gaps. HNS-Iat
5,500 N/cm2(8nO0psi) was initiated over substantially larger gaps than would
be expected from the remainder of the data of this task.
23
Discussion of Results
Even a cursory review of Table 3 shows the marked contrast of the initia-
ting ability of donors with and without end closures. The presence of high-
velocity, high-energy donor fragments made it possible to initiate using test
gaps of 7.6 cm (3 inches). Without such fragments, the successful gaps were
less than 0.7 cm (0.25 inch). In addition, donors with end closures initiated
through thicker and more dense acceptor closures, and transferred detonation
to less sensitive explosives. In Figure I0 these results are illustrated con-
ceptually. It shows that the energy sources, which are discussed in this
section, consist of fragments, gaseous products, or a total of the two. QUEST
donors produced a concentrated pattern of high-velocity fragments. There was
only a small decrease in fragment energy, even out to the maximum test gap of
7.6 cm (3 inches), hn the nther hand, the enerav decay from donor gaseous
r
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FIGURE 10 ENERGY AVAILABLE FROM A QUEST DONOR AS A FUNCTION OF DISTANCE
24
products was so rapid that at gaps greater than 0.7 cm (0.25 inch), the gas L
eous energy was insufficient to initiate the secondary explosives studied.
Measurements of the combined effect of fragments and gaseous products were
made at a gap of 0.38 cm (0.15 inch). At this distance, which coincidentally
is a typical aerospace production gap, it is estimated that only about 30%
of the energy is derived from the gaseous products.
Donor fraqment enerqy. - Experimental results of task l showed that do-
nor fragments with an average velocity of 0.276 cm/usec (g_4N ft/sec),
equivalent to energy of 72 cal/cm2, would not initiate a TATB acceptor com-
pacted at ll,O00 N/cm 2 (16,000 psi) in a O.OlO cm (0.004 inch) thick stain-
less steel cup. This results was contrary to that expected, based on the
pressure induced in the acceptor explosive computed by the Hugoniot method
to be approximately 200 Kbar, compared to the 74 Kbar SSGT sensitivity mea-
sured for the TATB acceptor explosive, (ref. 6). This difference is explained
by the work of Walker and Wasley (ref. 7), which showed that the critical
parameter for initiation is the energy, not the pressure, induced in each of
three acceptor explosives which they studied. Based on the critical energy
concept of initiation, an explanation of task l results is given conceptually
Pressure Pulse from Thin
Donor Fragments
Pressure Pulse from SSGT
Time
FIGURE 11 PRESSURE vs ENERGY CONCEPTS OF INITIATION
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in Figure II. Even though the pressure induced in the TATBacceptor was sub-
stantially higher than the pressure measuredas required by SSGTtesting,
the time of pressure application with thin, 0.010 cm (0.004 inch), donor frag-
ments is substantially less than that for the Lucite spacer, 0.28 cm (_.II
inch) for the SSGT50%-fire point for TATBat II,000 N/cm2(16,000 psi).
Accordingly, less energy, corresponding to the area under the pressure-time
curve, is induced by fragments than by the gap test.
A summaryof fragment energy initiation tests is given in Table 4.
These tests were conductedat air gaps of 1.27 to 7.62 cm (0.50 to 3.0 inches),
so that the effect of donor gaseousdetonation products is negligible. The
donor fragment energy, expressed in cal/cm2, is computedfrom the fragment
velocity, mass, and area. The amountof energy actually transferred to the
acceptor explosive is less than that shownin column1 of Table 4 becauseof:
(I) slight donor fragment spreading (somefragments miss the acceptor),
(2) the presence of acceptor closures (a portion of the donor energy is trans-
ferred to this closure), and (3) the donor fragments retain somekinetic energy
after impact. Examination of Table 4 showsthat whenthe donor energy, ex-
pressed in cal/cm2, wasgreater numerically than the acceptor explosive sensi-
tivity expressed in kilobars, then initiation took place, even through accep-
ter closures of various thicknesses. Whendonor fragment energy was less,
initiation did not take place, except for the -4 donor which initiated DATBin
task I. In this instance, as well as in the tests in task I0 where partial suc-
cess wasachieved, damageto the acceptor bushing was less than normal. This
suggests the possibility that the acceptor explosive had not completely det-
onated, even though the RDXdetonating cord was initiated.
The abovenumerical comparisonbetweenquantities of pressure and energy
mayseemincongruous. However, it should be noted that although SSGTsensitiv-
ity results are expressed in pressure units, they actually indicate the energy
transmitted to the acceptor explosive. This is becausepressure induced in
the acceptor and the time of application are both functions of the plastic
attenuator thickness.
Further backgroundon the relationship betweenexplosive sensitivity and
critical energy is given in Table 5. The flyer plate experiments of Gittings
(ref. I0), and Walker and Wasley (ref. 7), as well as the computations of
Price (ref. II) indicate a reasonable correlation betweenthe initiation energy
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TABLE4 FRAGMENT ENERGY INITIATION TESTS
Air Gaps- 1.27 to 7.62 cm
Propagation
Donor,Fragment Aceeptor,SSGT
Energy(cal/cm2) Sensitivity (kbar) AcceptorClosure
Thickness(cm)
Task No.
-1, (72)
-4, (39)
-5, (34)
-2, (66)
-2, (66)
-2, (66)
(78)
(32)
(32)
TATB, (74)
DATB, (45)
DATB, (45)
HNS-I, (25)
HNS-II (19)
HNS-II (19)
TATB, (74)
HNS-I (25)
HNS-I, (25)
No-Fire (0.010SS)
Fire (0.010SS)
No-Fire (0.010SS)
50%- Fire (0.064SS)
50%- Fire (0.028SS)
50%- Fire (0.033Pb)
F ire (0.010SS)
Fire (0.094SS)
Fire (0.094SS)
1
1
1
5
5
6
lO
11
12
induced in an acceptor explosive and its gap test sensitivity. The work by
McDonnell Aircraft Company on the ManneH Orbital La_r_tor,y (MNL) and QUEST
involved the use of small donors in which the energy source was high-velocity
closure fragments. For this method also, the fragment energy for successful
initiation was also indicated by gap test sensitivity. Table 5 shows the
correlation for a group of explosives with an extremely wide range of sensi-
tivities, from 13 to 74 kilobars. While the QUEST program primarily used steel
cups or closures as the source of donor fragment energy, other materials,
including brass, titanium, and aluminum, were also tested. A comparison of
these four closure materials is shown in Figure 12. These equivalent-mass
closures all show a relatively concentrated impact pattern at a gap of 7.62 cm
(3 inches). Qualitative examination of the Lucite witness blocks shows the
following efficiency ranking of these materials in terms of energy delivery:
(I) titanium, (2) steel, (3) brass, and (4) aluminum.
Donor 9aseous energy.- The ability of donor gaseous energy to propagate
detonation was evaluated by the use of donors with no end closures, thus
eliminating fragment energy. Using a single donor configuration (the -2 group
2?
TABLE 5 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXPLOSIVE
SENSITIVITY AND CRITICAL ENERGY
Explosive
PB X-9404
LX-04
HNS-I
Density
(g/cm3)
1.840
1.860
1.555
Gap Test
Sensitivity,
Pressure (kbar)
13
25
25
Critcal
Energy,
Ec (cal/cm 2)
12
26
Ec < 34
Investigator,
or Program
Gittings I0
Walker, Wasley 7
MOL
TNT
TNT
DATB
TATB
1.620
1.645
1.676
29
45
32
34
1.762 74
39
72 < Ec < 78
Price 11
Walker, Wasley 7
QUEST
QUEST
Closure Material
Closure Thickness (cm)
Velocity (cml/.tsec)
Fragment Pattern at 7.62 cm
Steel Brass Titanium Aluminum
0.010 0.010 0.020 0.030
0.228 O.192 0.305 0.201
FIGURE 12
_! "_' =-,,=
I D" i"
___ __._ J___
FRAGMENT PATTERNS FROM VARIOUS CLOSURE MATERIALS
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of Table 1 with the closure cup bottom cut away) 50%-fire air gaps were meas-
ured in terms of acceptor explosive sensitivity, closure thickness, and den-
sity. The results are plotted in Figures 13, 14, and 15, respectively. In
addition, the effect of donor explosive diameter on _0%-fire air gap was also
evaluated, and these results are presented in Figure 16. The most significant
result with respect to gaseous energy initiation, as shown by those four
figures, is that propagation could be successfully accomplished only across
very small gaps, in marked contrast to the large propagation gaps for donor
fragments.
The effect of acceptor explosive sensitivity on gaseous energy initiation
was evaluated, using the acceptors shown in Figure 13. These explosives, at
the indicated compaction pressures, were selected to cover a wide range of SSGT
sensitivities from 14 kilobars, for RDX compacted at 22,000 N/cm 2 (32,000 psi),
to 74 kilobars, for TATB compacted at II,000 N/cm 2 (16,000 psi). The 50%-fire
air gap generally decreases with decreasing SSGT sensitivity (i.e., increasing
pressure in kilebars required for initiation), with one marked exception.
HNS-I, compacted at 5,500 N/cm 2 (8,000 psi) with an SSGT sensitivity of 20 kilo-
bars, had a 5n%-fire air gap of 0.649 cm (0.255 inch). This gap is substan-
tially greater than would be expected from the remainder of the data. For exam-
ple, the corresponding gap for RDX compacted at 22,000 N/cm 2 (32,000 psi) with
a sensitivity of 14 kilobars, was only 0.325 cm (0.128 inch). One possible
explanation for the large HNS-I gap is that the combination of extremely small
particle size and relatively low compaction pressure resulted in building to
detonation within the acceptor charge.
Both Figures 14 and 15 give the extent of decrease of 50%-fire air gap with
increasing closure mass, the former as a result of increasing thickness of
steel closure, and the latter due to increasing the density of closure materials
with a constant 0.030 cm (0.012 inch) thickness. The significance of these
results from a design standpoint is discussed in the "APPLICATION OF
RESULTS" section.
The Figure 16 curve shows that as explosive diameter increases, there is
a corresponding increase in 50%-fire air gap. This result correlates with pre-
vious small-scale air gap testing reported by other investigators (ref. 12).
However, the small gaps reported in the literature and obtained in QUEST test-
ing of gaseous energy initiation are in marked contrast to the fragment
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initiation results throughout the program and particularly those obtained in
Task !l, when small diameter donors were tested using end closures. An exam-
ple of this difference is the result obtained with the smallest explosive dia-
meter, O.191 cm (0.075 inch) for l,oth donor and acceptor. With no closure on
either the donor or acceptor, the 50%-fire air gap was O.ll7 cm (0.N46 inch);
on the other hand, with a O.OlO cm (0.004 inch) steel donor closure and an air
gap of 1.27 cm (0.50 inch), the 50%-fire acceptor closure was 0.066 cm (0.026
inch) thick steel. The design significance of this striking difference is dis-
cussed in "Application of Results."
Combined fragment and gaseous energy initiation.- When initial tests of
fragment initiation of TATB at qaps more than 2.54 cm (l.O inch) proved
unsuccessful in task #1, the experimental approach used was to reduce the
separation air gap so that donor gaseous energy would be superimposed on that
from the fragments. At an air gap of 0.381 cm (0.15 inch), when the same TATB
acceptor was tested with the six groups of donors listed in Table l, the two
most powerful donors resulted in all-fires; the -3 group, in partial fires;
and the three weakest donors, in no-fires. These results are summarized in
Table 6. For each donor group the fragment, gaseous, and total energy are list-
ed in cal/cm 2. For example, the -l donor has 72 cal/cm 2 fragment energy (from
Table l) and 23 cal/cm2 gaseous energy for a total of 95 cal/cm2. The gaseous
energy figure is an estimate based on: (1) the numerical relationship shown
between critical energy and SSGT sensitivity, and (2) the initiation results
obtained in task 6 with gaseous energy resulting in a 50%-fire gap of 0.35 cm
(0.14 inch) with a bare acceptor of HNS-I compacted to 22,000 N/cm2 (32,000 psi)
and whose SSGT sensitivity is 25 kbar. The Table 6 results show that if the
donor total energy is significantly greater than the acceptor explosive sensi-
tivity in kilobars, detonation transfer takes place. When the donor energy
was substantially less than this value, there were no-fires; when these values
were about equal, a partial fire condition occurred. These experimental
results are illustrated in Figure 17. The Lucite witness block shows the frag-
ment impact pattern from donor and acceptor. For the most powerful donor
(the -l at the far right), note the strong pattern from the donor cup and fer-
rule fragments. The accepter cup fragment pattern shows that the acceptor
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TABLE6 COMBINED FRAGMENT AND GASEOUS ENERGY
INITIATION BY VARIOUS STRENGTH DONORS
Air Gap - 0.381 cm
Donor; Energy -
Fragment, Gaseous,
(Total, cal./cm 2)
-1; 72, 23, (95)
-2; 66, 22, (88)
-3; 56, 20, (76)
-4; 39, 18, (57)
-5; 34, 17 (51)
-6; 29, 16, (45)
Acceptor,
Compaction, SSGT
Sensitivity (kbar)
TATB, 16,000, (74)
Propagation
All-Fire
All-Fire
1 of 5 Fired
No-Fire
No-Fire
No-Fire
Task No.
charge detonated. The decreasing donor strength is visible in the donor frag-
ment patterns looking from right to left (-I to -6). While all of the donors
detonated, the cup fragment patterns become progressively weaker, and for the
-4, -5 and -6 donors, the ferrule fragments are not accelerated at sufficient
speed to give a significant impact pattern. This is because the ferrule frag-
ments are much heavier than the cup fragments, and therefore more sensitive to
the decrease in donor output. With respect to acceptor cup fragment patterns,
note that in addition to -I donor test, uniform acceptor fragment patterns
indicate initiation for the three -2 donors, and for one of five of the -3
donors (test 36). On the remainder of the tests, detonation transfer did not
take place, as shown by the irregular or missing acceptor pattern. This was
further confirmed by the failure of the acceptor charge to initiate the wit-
ness detonating cord.
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FIGURE 17 FRAGMENT PATTERNS FROM VARIOUS STRENGTH DONORS
Additional test results on combined fragment and gaseous initiation are
summarized in Table 7. This compilation is for a single-donor configuration,
but using acceptor explosives of various sensitivities. This table indicates
that when total donor energy exceeded acceptor SSGT sensitivity, initiation
took place; and the greater the difference, the thicker the acceptor closure
for a 50%-fire condition. These results correlate with those obtained for
fragment energy alone (Table 4).
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TABLE7 COMBINED FRAGMENT AND GASEOUS ENERGY INITIATION
Air Gap (0.381 cm, Except as Noted)
Donor; Energy -
Fragment, Gaseous,
(Total, Cat/cm2)
-2; 66, 22 (88)
-2; 66, 22 (88)
-2; 66, 22 (88)
Accepter, SSGT
Sensitivity (kbar)
TATB, (74)
TATB, (53)
TAT8, (43)
DATB, (45)
HNS-I, (25)
RDX, (14)
TAT8, (74)
50%- Fire Steel
Accepter
Closure, cm (in.)
0.015 (O.O06)
0.020 (0.008)
0.020 (0.008)
O.O33 (0.013)
0.064 (0.025)
0.064 (0.025)
No Accepter
Closure,
1.04 cm Air Gap
Task No.
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APPLICATIONOFRESULTS
Results of this programsuggest a newapproach to the problem of deter-
mining probability of detonation transfer. In addition, from a system relia-
bility standpoint, the significance of the following parameters wasdetermined:
acceptor explosive particle size, acceptor closure material, and donor design.
Finally, the limitation of the plate dent test as a meansof determining ,_et-
onation transfer capability was demonstrated.
Reliability concept.- As discussed in the Introduction, the methods
presently used to determine reliability of detonation transfer include penalty
gap testing, the VARICOMP method, and plate dent tests. The QUEST program re-
sults suggest another approach as illustrated in Figure 18. Experimentally,
this approach can be accomplished as follows:
(I) Fire a sample group of donors, measure the fragment velocity, and
compute fragment energy and standard deviation.
(2) Fire a second group of donors with the end closures removed, and at
the maximum required air gap determine gaseous energy alone, using
bare acceptor explosives of various sensitivities.
(3) Add measured fragment and gaseous energy to obtain total, and stand-
ard deviation.
(4) Since the acceptor explosive and its compaction pressure are known,
the energy required and its standard deviation will be indicated by
SSGT sensitivity results. The additional energy required because
of attenuation by acceDtor closure mass can be determined from QUEST
results.
(5) Statistical comparison of energy supplied with that required will
give probability of detonation transfer.
It should be emphasized that there are limitations and uncertainties to
the above approach. First, the critical energy concept of Walker and Wasley
(ref. 7) is based on the energy actually induced in the acceptor explosive.
Only a portion of the donor fragment energy would be transferred. Secondly,
while QUEST results show that SSGT sensitivity is an indication of energy re-
quired for initiation, no exact correlation has been established. From the
standpoint of designing reliable initiation systems, these are not considered
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Energy - Cal./cm 2
Energy Required Determined by:
• Acceptor Explosive SSGT Sensitivity
• Acceptor Closure Material, Thickness
Energy Supplied
I
Energy Supplied by:
• Donor Fragments
• Gaseous Products
FIGURE 18 RELIABILITY CONCEPT
serious limitations. For example, in task I0 it was demonstrated that a small
donor containing I00 mg of HNS-I, with a 0.381 cm (0.15 inch) explosive dia-
meter and a 0.010 cm (0.004 inch) thick steel closure could repeatedly initiate
a TATB acceptor with a SSGT sensitivity of 74 kilobars across a 7.6 cm (3 inch)
air gap. Since the SSGT sensitivities of generally used aerospace acceptor
explosives are less than 25 kilobars, at normal production gads a properly
designed small detonator should be capable of supplying many times the quan-
tity of energy needed for initiation.
Acceptor explosive particle size.- The results of task 5, showing that
HNS-II is more sensitive to gaseous energy but that HNS-I is more sensitive to
fragments, appear to be a sensitivity reversal for a single explosive. How-
ever, these results are consistent with those obtained by other investigators.
For example, the SSGT sensitivity of HNS-II at 22,000 N/cm 2 (32,000 psi) is
19 kilobars, while that of HNS-I at the same pressure is 25 kilobars. Thus,
HNS-II is more sensitive to shock initiation through polymethyl methacry-
late, just as in the QUEST work it was more sensitive to gaseous energy
attenuated by an air gaD. On the other hand, Kilmer (ref. 13), and Chamber-
lain and Stresau (ref. 14), conducted shock initiation tests on HNS-I and
HNS-II using detonating cords between 5.3 and 10.6 mg/cm (2.5 to 5 grains per
foot). With this small initiation stimulus, these investigators found HNS-I
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to be moresensitive than HNS-II. Thus, it aDpearsthat the stimulus pro-
vided by fragment initiation under task 5 conditions corresponds to the
shock stimulus from small coreload detonating cord.
Fromthe standpoint of hardwaredesign, these results showthat for
miniature devices, such as detonating cord end boosters which must be initia-
ted by either low coreload detonating cord or by fragments, the choice of a
small particle size explosive, such as HNS-I, is indicated. However,for the
output charge of a detonator initiated by a booster charge of about N.38 cm
(0.15 inch) in diameter, the larger particle size HNS-II would be preferable.
Acceptor closure mass. - In most designs, acceptor closures are required
to provide an environmental seal. QUEST results shDw that as acceptor clos-
ure mass is increased, detonation transfer capability is correspondingly de-
creased, both by gaseous energy (Figures 14 and 15) and by fragment energy
(Table 4). This can be explained, based on the critical energy concept of
initiation, as resulting from a portion of the available donor energy being
transferred to the acceptor closure material. The greater the closure mass,
the more energy that is absorbed, and the less available for the acceptor ex-
plosive. For system design involving detonating cord, the experiments in-
volving acceptor closure mass show that the practice of initiation through the
side of high density metallic sheathing would cause attenuation of a substan-
tial portion of the detonator energy. For a given detonator, improved det-
onation transfer would be achieved by the use of an acceptor booster charge
compacted in a thin-walled cup at the point of initiation.
Donor design.- During task II, donor explosive column diameter was re-
duced in increments, from 0.381 cm (0.15 inch) to 0.191 cm (0.075 inch). For
gaseous energy initiation, the 50%-fire air gap decreased significantly as
explosive column was reduced, as shown in Figure 16. This effect did not occur
for fragment initiation, as shown in Table 3. This indicates that there is a
design alternative to the practice of increasing the size of the donor output
charge to increase detonation transfer capability. By designing the donor
closure so that high-energy fragments are impacted on the acceptor, effective
detonation transfer can be achieved without the undesirable blast effects
associated with a large detonator. Of the three most common donor closure
metals, task 12 results showed steel to be most effective for transferring
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this energy, followed by brass, and aluminum. A practical exampleof the im-
portance of these findings involves the design of miniature detonators. One
such commercially available detonator, which is 0.23 cm (0.09 inch) outside
diameter and contains 35 mgof high explosive_ has an aluminumcase. Themanu-
facturer states that this detonator is capable of initiating tetryl over a
0.089 cm (0.035 inch) air gap. In contrast, the 0.191 cm (0.075 inch) inside
diameter donor of task II, with a 0.010 cm (0.004 inch) thick steel closure,
contained only 20 mgexplosive output charge. Yet, it initiated HNS-I (less
sensitive than tetryl) compactedat 22,000 N/cm2(32,000 psi) against a
0.051 cm (0.020 inch) thick steel acceptor closure, over a 1.27 cm (0.50 inch)
air gap. Fromthe abovedata, it appears that the aluminumcase fragments of
the commercial detonator do not appreciably enhanceits ability to propagate
detonation, and that for this detonator substitution of a higher density case
could be expected to improve this aspect of performance.
Plate dent test limitations. - QUEST results indicate that the plate dent
test has serious limitations as an index of detonator gap jumDing ability.
Figure 19 compares dents obtained on two donors, which were identical except
that one had a 0.010 cm thick steel closure, while the other had no closure.
Essentially equal plate dents were obtained, despite the enormous difference
the closure made in ability to propaqate detonation over air gaps. This result
Closure No Closure
Donor With Closure:
Donor Without Closure:
Propagation Ability
Detonated HNS-I (22,000 N/cm 2) at 1.27 cm
Air Gap Through 0.081 cm Steel
Acceptor Closure
Detonated HNS-I (22,000 K/cm 2) at 0.317 cm
Air Gap With No Acceptor Closure
FIGURE 19 PLATE DENT TEST
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is in direct contradiction to the underlined portion of the following quotation
from the U.S. Armypublication, titled "Explosive Trains" (ref. 12):
"Most experimental determination of the relative effectivess of
explosive charges in initiating other charges has beendoneas
part of a study of a specific system. Hence, the variables are
generally so intermingled as to makegeneralizations from such data
difficult. However,the evidence that the volume of dent which a
charge makes in a steel block is nearly proportional to its effect-
iveness as an initiator, combined with relatively broad and inter-
pretable plate-dent data, makes it possible to derive relationships
which appear to have relatively broad applicability."
Dent tests have received much emphasis because they are the only perform-
ance tests for detonators in the basic Department of Defense Military Stand-
ard on fuzes (ref. 3). Yet, these tests do not adequately define detonator
performance because they measure only the effect of gaseous detonation pro-
ducts at "zero" air gap. QUEST results show that for the air gaps required
on most aerospace applications, there is significantly more energy available
from the case or closure fragments of a properly designed detonator. From
an applications standpoint, this means that a group of detonators can give
uniform plate dent results, and yet have substantially different ability to
initiate detonation. The critical importance of the case or closure must be
recognized and controlled.
4o
CONCLUSIONS
A complete analysis of detonation transfer probability must include
evaluation of the amountof energy:
o Supplied by donor fragments and gaseousdetonation products
o Attenuated by the air gap separating the donor and acceptor, and by
the acceptor closure mass
o Required for initiation of the acceptor explosive, as indicated by
gap test sensitivity results
For the configurations tested in this program, the following maybe con-
cluded:
(I) Detonation transfer can be accomplishedby donor fragments,
gaseousdetonation products, or a combination of the two.
(2) Donor fragments proved to be substantially more effective than
gaseousproducts for initiation of secondaryexplosives.
(3) For a given configuration, variation of donor output was the most
significant parameter affecting probability of detonation transfer.
(4) The principle of accomplishing detonation transfer basedon supply-
ing a critical amountof energy to the acceptor explosive was shown
to be valid for detonators and closures of typical aerospace design.
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RECOMMENDATIONSF RFUTUREWORK
The following items are suggestedas having merit for further investi-
gation:
(I) The demonstratedefficiency of fragment initiation should be
investigated for military explosive trains. An examplewould
be the achievementof Safe/Armfuzing capability with no moving
parts by controlling the direction of donor fragments.
(2) The surprisingly high aensitivity demonstratedby HNS-Iat low com-
paction pressure should be studied further becauseof the widespread
aerospace usageof this explosive.
(3) Detonator design should be studied from the standpoint of improve-
ments that can be achieved by taking full advantageof the energy
generated by donor fragments. Efforts in this area should lead to
significant reduction in detonator size, while at the sametime
achieving imDroveddetonation transfer capability.
(4) Since most aerospace detonators are built and tested to military
specifications, additional work is neededon these documentsto
assure that detonation transfer capability is adequately measured.
_2
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